May 15: NYC and NYS March Job Market Data

The statewide unemployment rate decreased from 4.4% to 4.3% in March 2017, according to preliminary figures released today by the New York State Department of Labor. This represents New York State’s lowest unemployment rate since February 2007. Pushing the statewide rate lower was another drop in New York City’s rate, which declined from 4.3% to 4.0% in March 2017. New York City’s rate is at an all-time low on records going back to 1976. Continue Reading.

May 15: NYC and NYS March Job Market Data2017-05-18T00:33:41+00:00

El Super Clasico: Trade and Technology Duke it out at CUNY

Branko Milanovic
April 27, 2017

Graduate Center CUNY organized yesterday (April 26) a star-studded discussion of the effects of trade on US jobs and wages. The participants were David Autor and Ann Harrison, both authors of seminal economic papers on the effects of China’s imports on US employment and wages (and professors at respectively MIT and Wharton), Brad DeLong, a polymath and former high Treasury official in Clinton’s administration (and professor at Berkeley), and Paul Krugman, Nobel Prize winner, professor at the Graduate Center CUNY, and probably one of the three most influential economists in the world.

The discussion was started by David Autor who pointed out that although US manufacturing employment was on a downward trend since 1943 (when it accounted for almost 40% of the labor force), what happened in the early 2000s with China’s accession to the WTO was a sharp (“off-the-cliff”) decrease in the number of manufacturing jobs. Between the late 1990s and today some 5 million manufacturing jobs were lost. While Autor thought that technological change was indeed a big factor explaining longer term trends the most recent drop cannot be dissociated from trade (import penetration from China).

Next, in the opening statements, Ann Harrison, referring to two very important papers which she coauthored, argued that the effects of trade are visible when one follows workers by occupation much more than when one looks simply at a given industry. Thus, people displaced by trade, even if they ultimately get reemployed, lose some 25% of their wage. The second paper of Ann Harrison carries a possibly slightly different message: many jobs were lost because capital goods became cheaper, and machines thus substituted for labor. It is a technology story with a twist: technological change responded to the change in relative prices. Harrison said that her position on the technology-trade (TT) debate is probably closer to the presumed position that Brad DeLong (the next speaker) would take than David Autor’s.

Indeed, in his opening statement DeLong supported the technology explanation although, since he made this point after a long detour through his family history, it was not too clear to me whether it still applied to the current situation and China in particular.

Paul Krugman (the statements were made in alphabetical order), referred to the similar TT discussions in the 1990s where the consensus was that some 2/3 or more of the job and wage effects were due to technology. But, Krugman said, economists might have been right on trade’s limited role then; yet keeping the same opinions now was wrong since the boost in trade that has occurred in the past 20 years was much greater than what the US witnessed in the 1990s. He thought that trade today has a massive impact but that it is one-off event, linked to China, and unlikely to be replicated.

If soccer-like I were to summarize the positions, I would say that Autor and Krugman were of the opinion that “trade matters” while Harrison and DeLong tended to favor technological explanation. But that classification is too rough. Autor’s own work, of which he briefly spoke later, shows huge importance of technology, especially in displacing routine labor. (My favorite paper of Autor, Dorn and Hanson is the one which pits the trade vs. technology stories against each other and finds that both…matter.) Similarly, as I mentioned, Harrison does find incontrovertible impact of trade too.

There were at least three areas where the panelists seemed to agree.

(1) Withdrawing from globalization would be extremely costly for the US and the world. DeLong pointed out to the asymmetric effects of NAFTA. While he argued that NAFTA (trade with Mexico) had a miniscule impact on US job loss, withdrawing from NAFTA today would have an enormous negative impact because of the number and density of trade links that have been established in the past two decades. Everybody agreed that it was madness to withdraw from globalization and to go back to protectionism.

(2) Everybody agreed that economists underestimated the impact of trade. As Autor put it, the benefits of trade (cheaper goods) are diffuse, but the costs are concentrated (aka you lose your job). Krugman thought that this was because economists, enamored by the “jewel in the crown of economics”, theory of comparative advantage, tend to look at average effects, not at the heterogeneity of effects. He thought that this was changing now.

On a more philosophical note, Autor added that workers are people (yes) and that even if the compensating mechanisms for job loss were effective (Ann Harrison said they were not), people desire to have meaningful jobs and high wages rather than to subsist on handouts.

(3) The China effect will not reoccur. As I mentioned, the point was made by Krugman in the opening statement, but was expanded on by both DeLong and Autor. DeLong thought that China will be the last example of export-driven development, made possible by the willingness of the US to be open to Asian imports (Japan and Korea before) and by the eagerness of the rest of the world to cover US deficits by squirreling the money in the United States. DeLong thus touched upon the global political economy issues which paradoxically made the richest economy in the world be capital importer rather than exporter. (Yet another example, in my opinion, of how with globalization many of the nostrums of the mid-century neoclassical economics got overturned.) But the one-off effect of China (no Indias, Ethiopias, Burmas waiting in the wings) means that the current trade effects on US labor are not going to be repeated.

It was a great evening. The top economists in perhaps the hottest area of economic policy dispute today duked it out in a very fair way, and came out to a fairly consensual position. We are back to 1817 where trade and technology (the famous Chapter XXXI) played such a great role in Ricardo’s “Principles”.

Branko Milanovic’s original post.

El Super Clasico: Trade and Technology Duke it out at CUNY2018-07-04T19:37:51+00:00

April 14: The CPI decreased 0.3 percent in March.

The Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) decreased 0.3 percent in March on a seasonally adjusted basis, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Over the last 12 months, the all items index rose 2.4 percent before seasonal adjustment. Continue reading.

April 14: The CPI decreased 0.3 percent in March.2017-05-07T00:36:40+00:00

The New York City Labor Market: Recent Developments

James Orr
April 04/Revised April 09, 2017

Recently-revised employment data show New York City jobs grew 2.2 percent in 2016, more than 90,000 jobs, well above the national growth rate of 1.8 percent and statewide growth of 1.5 percent.  The relatively strong job performance in the city compared to the nation did not develop recently but has been a consistent feature of the recovery and expansion of employment from its cyclical low in 2010.  The strength of the city’s job growth is even more remarkable in that it contrasts sharply with the considerably deeper decline and slower recovery of employment in the city compared to the nation in the prior cycle.  This post looks at the city‘s job growth following the 2008-2009 downturn and delves further into several labor market developments in the city that have supported, and been supported by, this rapid job growth. 

The figure below, adapted from an earlier presentation, presents an index of monthly employment levels from 2000 to 2016 in New York City, New York State and the nation.  Almost from the start of the recovery of jobs in 2010, the job growth rate in New York City exceeded that of the nation and has pushed the level of employment well above both its cyclical low and its peak employment level in the previous cycle.  A measure of overall economic activity in the city also shows a relatively mild downturn and robust recovery beginning in late 2009.  Statewide employment growth has closely matched that of the nation, indicating relatively weaker job performance in other parts of the state.  The upturn is also remarkable in that it reverses the pattern seen in the downturn of the early 2000s.  Then, the city’s employment losses were significantly deeper than that of the nation.  Of course, the 9/11 attack occurred just after the downturn began which further weakened employment in the city’s economy, in general, and  Lower Manhattan in particular.  At that time, a full recovery to pre-downturn levels in the city didn’t occur until almost three years after the nation had recovered.

Three significant developments have accompanied this relatively rapid growth of jobs in the city since 2010.  The first is the fact that the expansion of jobs has not been led, as it has been in prior recoveries, by job growth in the city’s key financial sector.  While still a major force in the city’s economy, generating about a fifth of total city earnings, jobs in the sector have increased only modestly over this period, and as a result the finance sector’s share in total employment in the city has declined over the period.  Key sources of growth have been an array of traditional services sectors, including the education and health and leisure and hospitality sectors, which are important sources of employment across the city and where growth has significantly outpaced that of the nation.  Construction and retail trade have also grown fairly robustly in this upturn, and there has been dramatic growth in the city’s tech sector.  While there is no established definition of the component of the tech sector, a recent report aggregated jobs in a number of sectors where the firms used technology as the core of their business strategy.  That report showed that tech jobs defined in this way more than doubled between 2007 and 2014 and contributed significantly to the city’s overall job growth. 

A second development is that from 2010 to 2014 the city’s population expanded 4.6 percent, supported by positive net migration, and the annual average rate of growth was stronger than any seen in the city since the 1920s.  The rapid population growth over this period was also a sizeable increase over the growth rate recorded in the city over the prior decade.  This rapid growth is also consistent with the notion of an increasing attractiveness of urban areas more generally, and recent population growth rates in a number of big cities has been considerably faster than in the prior decade, and earlier, including Los Angeles, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Dallas and Washington, D.C.  

Third, the labor force participation rate in the city has not been declining.  Nationally, the labor force participation rate, or the share of the population that participates in the labor force, has been problematic in this cycle.  On an annual average basis, the rate fell from its pre-recession value of about 66.0 percent to a low of 62.7 percent in 2015 before turning up.  In New York City, the participation rate, while below that of the nation, rose modestly from 59 percent in 2007 to 60 percent in 2010 and then has remained at roughly that rate to the present. Unlike the nation where demographics—the aging of the population—contributed to the declining participation rate, a recent report suggests a key part of the reason for rising labor force participation rates in the city since 2010 is also demographics—the city’s younger population with relatively high rates of labor force participation.

While the high participation in the labor force is encouraging, a measure of how New York residents are faring from the rapid employment growth is the unemployment rate, or the share of the labor force without jobs.  The city’s 5.2 percent average unemployment rate in 2016, though well off its peak rates in 2010, was moderately above the 4.9 unemployment rate in the nation.  Alternative estimates of the underutilization of labor for the nation and New York City are now reported by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The broadest of these measures, termed U-6, includes with the unemployed discouraged workers, those who want work but did not actively look in past four weeks and also those who want full-time work but are working part-time for economic reasons.  The 9.6 percent rate in New York City for all of 2016, a similar rate as the nation as a whole, is much higher than the unemployment rate, suggesting there remain residents who can take advantage of a further expansion of job opportunities in the city.        

Looking ahead, several indicators suggest a slowing in the employment expansion in New York City.  While still fairly high, job growth in the city in recent months has slowed from its 2015 pace.  Forecasts of job growth point to a deceleration in 2017 with some heightened policy uncertainty.  Annual job growth rates are projected to continue their decline though they are still expected to be in the range of 0.7 to 1.0 percent in 2020.  It will be important to track the city’s population and labor force trends should an environment of sharply decelerating growth develop.

The New York City Labor Market: Recent Developments2018-07-04T19:37:52+00:00

March 16: Federal Reserve to Raise Fed Funds Target Range to 3/4 to 1 Percent

The FOMC announced that in light of consistent job gains and the unemployment rate remaining unchanged in recent months it would raise the target range for the federal funds rate to 3/4 to 1 percent. The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting some further strengthening in labor market conditions and a sustained return to 2 percent inflation. Read more

 

March 16: Federal Reserve to Raise Fed Funds Target Range to 3/4 to 1 Percent2017-03-16T17:55:21+00:00

Two Theses on Health Policy

Paul Krugman
January 10/March 7, 2017

1. There Will Be No Obamacare Replacement
January 10, 2017 9:24 am

You may be surprised at the evident panic now seizing Republicans, who finally — thanks to James Comey and Vladimir Putin — are in a position to do what they always wanted, and kill Obamacare. How can it be that they’re not ready with a replacement plan?

That is, you may be surprised if you spent the entire Obama era paying no attention to the substantive policy issues — which is a pretty good description of the Republicans, now that you think about it.

From the beginning, those of us who did think it through realized that anything like universal coverage could only be achieved in one of two ways: single payer, which was not going to be politically possible, or a three-legged stool of regulation, mandates, and subsidies. Here’s how I put it exactly 7 years ago:

Start with the proposition that we don’t want our fellow citizens denied coverage because of preexisting conditions — which is a very popular position, so much so that even conservatives generally share it, or at least pretend to.

So why not just impose community rating — no discrimination based on medical history?

Well, the answer, backed up by lots of real-world experience, is that this leads to an adverse-selection death spiral: healthy people choose to go uninsured until they get sick, leading to a poor risk pool, leading to high premiums, leading even more healthy people dropping out.

So you have to back community rating up with an individual mandate: people must be required to purchase insurance even if they don’t currently think they need it.

But what if they can’t afford insurance? Well, you have to have subsidies that cover part of premiums for lower-income Americans.

short, you end up with the health care bill that’s about to get enacted. There’s hardly anything arbitrary about the structure: once the decision was made to rely on private insurers rather than a single-payer system

— and look, single-payer wasn’t going to happen — it had to be more or less what we’re getting. It wasn’t about ideology, or greediness, it was about making the thing work.

It’s actually amazing how thoroughly the right turned a blind eye to this logic, and some — maybe even a majority — are still in denial. But this is as ironclad a policy argument as I’ve ever seen; and it means that you can’t tamper with the basic structure without throwing tens of millions of people out of coverage. You can’t even scale back the spending very much — Obamacare is somewhat underfunded as is.

Will they decide to go ahead anyway, and risk opening the eyes of working- class voters to the way they’ve been scammed? I have no idea. But if Republicans do end up paying a big political price for their willful policy ignorance, it couldn’t happen to more deserving people.

2. A Plan Set Up To Fail
March 7, 2017 9:01 am

So now we know what Republicans have to offer as an Obamacare replacement. Let me try to avoid value judgments for a few minutes, and describe what seems to have happened here.

The structure of the Affordable Care Act comes out of a straightforward analysis of the logic of coverage. If you want to make health insurance available and affordable for almost everyone, regardless of income or health status, and you want to do this through private insurers rather than simply have single-payer, you have to do three things.

  • Regulate insurers so they can’t refuse or charge high premiums to people with preexisting conditions
  • Impose some penalty on people who don’t buy insurance, to induce healthy people to sign up and provide a workable risk pool.
  • Subsidize premiums so that lower-income households can afford insurance.

3. Subsidize premiums so that lower-income households can afford insurance

So that’s Obamacare (and Romneycare before that): regulation, mandates, and

subsidies. And the result has been a sharp decline in the number of uninsured, with costs coming in well below expectations. Roughly speaking, 20 million Americans gained coverage at a cost of around 0.6 percent of GDP.

Republicans have nonetheless denounced the law as a monstrosity, and promised to replace it with something totally different and far better. Which makes what they’ve actually come up … interesting.

For the GOP proposal basically accepts the logic of Obamacare. It retains insurer regulation to prevent exclusion of people with preexisting conditions. It imposes a penalty on those who don’t buy insurance while healthy. And it offers tax credits to help people buy insurance. Conservatives calling the plan Obamacare 2.0 definitely have a point.

But a better designation would be Obamacare 0.5, because it’s really about replacing relatively solid pillars with half-measures, severely and probably fatally weakening the whole structure.

First, the individual mandate – already too weak, so that too many healthy people opt out – is replaced by a penalty imposed if and only if the uninsured decide to enter the market later. This wouldn’t do much.

Second, the ACA subsidies, which are linked both to income and to the cost of insurance, are replaced by flat tax credits which would be worth much less to lower-income Americans, the very people most likely to need help buying insurance.

Taken together, these moves would almost surely lead to a death spiral. Healthy individuals, especially low-income households no longer receiving adequate aid, would opt out, worsening the risk pool. Premiums would soar – without the cushion created by the current, price-linked subsidy formula — leading more healthy people to exit. In much of the country, the individual markets would probably collapse.

The House leadership seems to realize all of this; that’s why it reportedly plans to rush the bill through committee before CBO even gets a chance to score it.

It’s an amazing spectacle. Obviously, Republicans backed themselves into a corner: after all those years denouncing Obamacare, they felt they had to do something, but in fact had no good ideas about what to offer as a replacement. So they went with really bad ideas instead.

Two Theses on Health Policy2018-07-04T19:37:52+00:00

March 10: Payroll Employment Rises by 235,000 in February

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
March 10, 2017

Total non-farm payroll employment increased by 235,000 in February, and the unemployment rate was little changed at 4.7 percent. Employment gains occurred in construction, private educational services, manufacturing, health care, and mining. Read more

March 10: Payroll Employment Rises by 235,000 in February2017-03-12T00:48:51+00:00
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